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Abstract. We calculate the dynamics of tax evasion within a multi-agent
econophysics model which is adopted from the theory of magnetism and
previously has been shown to capture the main characteristics from agent-based
based models which build on the standard Allingham and Sandmo approach.
In particular, we implement a feedback of public goods provision on the
decision-making of selfish agents which aim to pursue their self interest. Our
results imply that such a feedback enhances the moral attitude of selfish agents
thus reducing the percentage of tax evasion. Two parameters govern the behavior
of selfish agents, (i) the rate of adaption to changes in public goods provision
and (ii) the threshold of perception of public goods provision. Furtheron we
analyze the tax evasion dynamics for different agent compositions and under
the feedback of public goods provision. We conclude that policymakers may
enhance tax compliance behavior via the threshold of perception by means of
targeted public relations.
JEL classification: C15, H16, H30
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1 Introduction
Theoretical approaches to account for tax compliance are often based on
the seminal work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) which incorporates
potential penalties, tax rates and audit probabilities as basic parameters
in order to evaluate the expected utility of taxpayers. In the most basic
version of this neoclassical standard scheme the behavior of all taxpayers
enters via the average degree of risk aversion, related to the structure of
the underlying utility function. However, the reasons and motivations for
tax evasion in a society are manifold and it would obviously be desirable
to relate the behavior of individuals, embedded in their social network,
to global parameters such as risk aversion. In some sense this hierarchy
of modelling has a close match in physics where phenomenological laws
of thermodynamics can be derived within the concepts of statistical me-
chanics which are applied to the individual constituents of a macroscopic
system. For example, thermodynamic parameters such as the tempera-
ture of an ideal gas can be traced back to the average energy which is
distributed among the various degrees of freedom of the individual gas
molecules.
Within the economics domain, in particular tax evasion, the approach
by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) would correspond to the phenomeno-
logical level of description. On the other hand so-called agent-based
models have been set up as a comparatively new tool for analyzing tax
compliance issues on a more individual (i.e. ’microscopic’) level. An es-
sential feature of any agent-based model is the direct interaction between
agents, which is combined with some process that allows for changes in
individual behavior patterns.
According to Hokamp and Pickhardt (2010) and
Pickhardt and Seibold (2014) agent-based tax evasion models may
be categorized into an economics and econophysics domain. The latter
III
has been initiated by Lima and Zaklan (2008); Zaklan et al. (2008,
2009) and Lima (2010) by analyzing a suitable modification of the Ising
model (Ising, 1925), originally known from the theory of magnetism. In
contrast, if the interaction process is driven by parameter changes that
induce behavioral changes via utility functions and (or) by stochastic
processes that do not have physical roots, these models belong to
the economics domain. Examples include Mittone and Patelli (2000);
Davis et al. (2003); Bloomquist (2004, 2008); Antunes et al. (2007);
Korobow et al. (2007); Szabo´ et al. (2009, 2010); Hokamp and Pickhardt
(2010); Me´der et al. (2012); Nordblom and ˇZamac (2012); Andrei et al.
(2014); Hokamp (2014); Pellizzari and Rizzi (2014) of which some are
summarized by Bloomquist (2006), Pickhardt and Prinz (2014), and
Pickhardt and Seibold (2014).
In previous work Seibold and Pickhardt (2013);
Pickhardt and Seibold (2014) and more recently Hokamp and Seibold
(2014) have extended the Ising-based econophysics approach to tax
evasion toward the implementation of different agent types. This
theory is able to reproduce results from agent-based economics models
(Hokamp and Pickhardt, 2010) and therefore should be appropriate for
a quantitative analysis of tax compliance. Moreover, the econophysics
route to tax evasion may provide the formal framework to construct a
phenomenological ’global’ theory starting from a microscopic ’agent-
based’ description. However, before tackling this ambitious task it
is of course necessary to provide an econophysics description of tax
evasion which comprises the main ingredients inherent in contemporary
neoclassical approaches based on the work by Allingham and Sandmo
(1972).
In this regard, one crucial aspect which we aim to improve in the
present paper concerns the time evolution of social norms within the
IV Sascha Hokamp and Go¨tz Seibold
network of agents. In fact, all previous econophysics works mentioned
above classified the individual agents by two parameters, (i) a local field
describing the moral attitude of agents toward tax evasion and (ii) a local
temperature which governs the susceptibility of agents with regard to be-
havioral changes. Both parameters compete with the interaction between
agents which aims to conform the agent’s behavior within their social
network.
However, these parameters were fixed and therefore behavioral
changes only occured as a result of the statistical evaluation of the dy-
namics incorporating the aforementioned competition between interac-
tion of agents and their moral attitude and/or local temperature, respec-
tively.
Here we aim to go beyond this static description by incorporating
social norm updating into the agent-based econophysics approach to tax
evasion. In particular, we allow for dynamical changes in the moral at-
titude of agents due to public goods provision. Within standard agent-
based models this issue has been studied by Mittone and Patelli (2000);
Antunes et al. (2007); Szabo´ et al. (2009, 2010); Me´der et al. (2012);
Hokamp (2014); Pellizzari and Rizzi (2014) with partially contradictory
results. For example, Szabo´ et al. (2009, 2010) showed that increasing
the level of governmental services (e.g. health care) leads to less tax eva-
sion. Note that the authors consider more than 20 employment types and
four agent types, namely (i) elected administration, (ii) tax authority, (iii)
workers, and (iv) entrepreneurs. In contrast, Hokamp (2014) finds the
counterintuitive result that income tax compliance may decrease with
raising marginal per capita returns. The latter analysis is based on a
model with back auditing and four agent types which are also imple-
mented in the present paper (cf. Sec. 3).
VThe paper is organized as follows. In order to put our investiga-
tions into the appropriate economic context we present in Sec. 2 a
brief literature review regarding public goods provision and tax com-
pliance. In Sec. 3 we outline the basic ingredients of our econophysics
model [cf. Seibold and Pickhardt (2013); Hokamp and Seibold (2014);
Pickhardt and Seibold (2014)] and exemplify the approach for a society
with homogeneous agents which sets the stage for the following discus-
sion. The procedure how the provision of public goods influences on
selfish agents within our model is presented in Sec. 4 and corresponding
results are shown in Sec. 5. We finally conclude our discussion in Sec. 6.
2 Public Goods Provision and Tax Compliance: A
Literature Review
The modern root of public goods theory dates back to the seminal work
of Samuelson (1954) introducing a condition for Pareto-optimal allo-
cations: the sum of individual’s marginal rate of substitution has to
equal the marginal rate of transformation. Pickhardt (2003, 2006) sur-
veys modern public goods theory and the relevant literature therein,
e.g. Musgrave (1939); Samuelson (1954, 1955); Musgrave (1999);
Samuelson and Nordhaus (1998). Among other things, he observes a
large diversity in defining and using the terminus ’public good’ that is to
some extent conflicting or even contradicting. In our paper we adopt the
consumption-act-approach of Pickhardt (2003), i.e. properties of goods
are totally atomized into acts of consumption at any point in time and
then ’rival’ and ’non-rival’ consumption acts are used to determine pri-
vate and public goods characteristics, respectively. Note that the terminus
’non-rival in consumption’ was introduced to the literature by Musgrave
(1969, pg. 126) meaning ’[. . . ] that the same physical output (the fruits
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of the same factor input) is enjoyed by both [individuals,] A and B. This
does not mean that the same subjective benefit must be derived, or even
that precisely the same product quality is available to both.’ However,
with respect to income tax evasion and public goods provision we briefly
review below theoretical works of Cowell and Gordon (1988); Falkinger
(1988, 1991, 1995); Cowell (1992) and Bordignon (1993), as well as
experiments by Alm et al. (1992a,b); Mittone (2006); Alm (2010) and
Bazart and Pickhardt (2011). For details see Hokamp (2013).
Cowell and Gordon (1988) postulate a two dimensional continuum
of goods; on the one hand bounded by rivalness and non-rivalness and on
the other hand limited by ’excludability’ and ’non-excludability’. Note
that in the course of our paper excludability in consumption is assumed
if and only if options are feasible and enforceable to ban individuals from
consumption of these goods. Cowell and Gordon (1988) examine the in-
fluence of public goods provision on individual’s and average popula-
tion’s tax evasion behavior. The authors investigate (i) large populations,
where a single individual decision to commit tax evasion has no ob-
servable impact on public goods provision and (ii) decreasing absolute
risk aversion when increasing income. In addition, they assume under-
provision (over-provision) of public goods to deduce their counterintu-
itive key findings: raising a flat tax ceteris paribus increases (decreases)
tax evasion.
Falkinger (1988) adds the notion of tax as a price for public services
to the basic flat tax setting of Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Note that
these governmental provided public goods are non-rival – i.e. each agent
may consume the same amount – but individual’s utility of consump-
tion may differ. Falkinger (1988) then examines equity of government-
taxpayer relationships under presence of tax non-compliance and pub-
lic goods provision. He finds that tax evasion ceteris paribus is reduced
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if four assumptions are simultaneously fulfilled: (i) public goods pro-
vision only depends on expected tax revenues, (ii) behaviors of other
agents do not change (the ’Nash-assumption’, cf. ibid., pg. 390), (iii) tax
enforcement variables have to allow rational for a positive tax evasion,
and (iv) an additive utility function prevails. Eventually, his main insight
is ’[. . . ] that the equity argument is [rather] an ex post rationalization
of otherwise motivated tax evasion’ than an ex ante driving force (see
Falkinger, 1988, pp. 392-393).
Falkinger (1991) addresses a reverse question related to
Cowell and Gordon (1988), that is: How might tax evasion influ-
ence the optimal level of public goods provision? Using additive and
strictly concave utility functions Falkinger (1991) shows that the impact
of flat tax evasion on the optimal supply of public goods depends on the
magnitude of decreasing individual’s absolute risk aversion. To analyze
inequity Cowell (1992) enlarges the publicly-supplied-goods-approach
of Cowell and Gordon (1988) while maintaining their notion of public
goods (cf. above). As pointed out by Cowell (1992, pg. 541), the
essential problem of economic, psychological and social effects – which
simultaneously influence individual’s flat tax evasion behavior and
public goods provision – concentrates to one single crucial question:
’[c]an the person affect inequity directly by his own actions?’.
Bordignon (1993) extends the setting of Cowell and Gordon (1988)
via introducing taxpayers’ heterogeneity that refers to income, mag-
nitude of private consumption and audit probability. In particular,
Bordignon (1993, pg. 359) examines ’[. . . ] the fairness of the fiscal sys-
tem [. . . ]’ depending on tax structure, public goods provision and sub-
jects’ beliefs or individuals’ estimates of other peoples’ tax evasion. He
then finds that poor taxpayers ceteris paribus evade more (less) in abso-
lute terms than rich subjects, if the whole population is faced with low
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(high) tax rates. To allow for a comparison with Falkinger (1988) and
Cowell (1992) the author drops the assumption of agents’ heterogene-
ity and derives Pareto-optimal provision levels of public goods. Then –
within his homogeneous fairness-approach assuming under-provision
(over-provision) of public goods – Bordignon (1993) shows that rais-
ing the tax rate leads to zero (positive) tax evasion; where positive tax
evasion ceteris paribus increases (decreases) with low (high) tax rates.
Falkinger (1995) takes an economic and a psychological point of view
on flat tax evasion and equity that both base on Falkinger (1988, 1991)
and Cowell (1992). Yet, Falkinger (1995) explains counterintuitive re-
sults of Cowell (1992) through a decline of absolute risk aversion while
increasing equity.
Alm et al. (1992a) present a tax compliance experiment and find that
providing a surplus from tax payments – i.e. a public good – may work
to increase tax compliance. Alm et al. (1992b) provide an experimental
contribution to taxpayer’s mystery, that is, ’[w]hy do people pay taxes?’
Regarding this voluntary contribution puzzle Alm et al. (1992b) argue
that (i) taxpayers may value public goods provision, (ii) individuals prob-
ably err on the real extent of tax enforcement variables – in particular,
they might overweight audit probabilities – and (iii) subjects may hold
an extreme risk aversion. Further, the authors obtain that flat tax evasion
even occurs if expected returns of a tax gamble are negative. Mittone
(2006) conducts a dynamic tax evasion experiment under risk and uncer-
tainty. Among other things, the author finds that ’[. . . ] the production of a
public good reduces tax evasion but to a lesser extent than tax yield distri-
bution’ (Mittone, 2006, pg. 830). Alm et al. (1992b) conclude that new
theories are quite necessary to explain taxpayers’ responses frequently
observed in laboratory experiments with respect to taxes, evasion, public
goods provision, and the like. An interdisciplinary approach, e.g. behav-
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ioral economics, may fill in this gap. See economist (and chemist) Alm
(2010, pg. 636) for a history of the terminus ’behavioral economics’,
meaning ’[. . . ] an approach that uses methods and evidence from other
social sciences (especially psychology) to inform the analysis of individ-
ual and group decision making’. For a psychologist’s point of view see
Kirchler (2007).
Alm (2010) briefly surveys behavioral (public) economics; an in-
terdisciplinary research field that deviates from several standard neo-
classical assumptions, for instance, subjects may not always act ratio-
nal and selfish. In particular, the author distinguishes three experimen-
tal branches that examine (i) ’public goods’, (ii) ’tax compliance’ and
(iii) ’behavioral responses to taxes’ (cf. ibid., pg. 635). Furthermore,
Alm (2010, pg. 650) presents a brief overview of open tasks and promis-
ing ideas for future experiments in the domain of behavioral public eco-
nomics, which concern (i) ’intertemporal decisions’, (ii) ’social insurance
programs’ and (iii) ’behavior under uncertainty’. Finally, note that the au-
thor quotes the agent-based approach of Bloomquist (2011) to illustrate
a fruitful combination of laboratory experiments to computational simu-
lations for investigating the evolution of tax compliance dynamics over
time.
Bazart and Pickhardt (2011) conduct a flat tax compliance experi-
ment that examines the relationship of tax evasion and positive incentives
under public goods provision and lottery effects. Note that the seminal
work of Falkinger and Walter (1991) has added welfare improving posi-
tive rewards for audited individuals to the standard model of tax evasion,
that is Allingham and Sandmo (1972); i.e. taxpayers get a monetary pay-
back for their voluntarily paid taxes regardless of their actual extent of
tax cheating. On contrary, Bazart and Pickhardt (2011) employ non-rival
public goods and install an excludable flat tax gamble, where only fully
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compliant taxpayers can get the extra profit. In each round of the labo-
ratory experiment the public good as well as the permissible extra gain
is financed by voluntary contributions – i.e. taxes – forced reimburse-
ments and paid penalties, so that each individual influences marginally
the extent of public goods provision. Bazart and Pickhardt (2011) find
experimental evidence for gender effects: (i) females respond stronger to
an increase of penalties than males, (ii) females evade less than males,
and (iii) males react stronger than females to positive lottery rewards –
ceteris paribus yielding higher tax compliance rates.
Finally, to sum up reviewed neoclassical theoretical and experimen-
tal applications present a wide range of conclusions, effects, findings and
results that may appear to some extent ambiguous, counterintuitive, or
actually conflicting and contradicting with respect to income tax evasion,
public goods provision and their inter dependencies. Analogous discrep-
ancies also appear in agent-based models as already outlined in Sec. 1.
In the next section we proceed by introducing our econophysics agent-
based model for which we implement the influence of public goods in
Sec. 4.
3 The Agent-Based Econophysics Approach
Our considerations are based on the Ising model hamiltonian
H =−J ∑
〈i j〉
SiS j−∑
i
BiSi (1)
where J describes the coupling of Ising variables (spins) Si = +1,−1
between adjacent lattice sites denoted by 〈i j〉. In the present context
Si = +1(−1) is interpreted as a compliant (non-compliant) taxpayer.
Calculations have been done for a two-dimensional square lattice with
dimension 1,000×1,000 and periodic boundary conditions, i.e. a torus
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structure. We note that the results are not sensitive to the specific lattice
geometry. Within a similar econophysics model this issue has been an-
alyzed by Zaklan et al. (2009, 2008) and Lima and Zaklan (2008) who
consider, in addition, alternative lattice structures like the scale-free
Baraba´si-Albert network or the Voronoi-Delaunay network. In addition
Lima (2010) considers Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs and finds that the re-
sults for these alternative lattices do not differ significantly from those
obtained with a square lattice.
Eq. (1) contains also the coupling of the spins to a local magnetic field
Bi which can be associated with the morale attitude of the agents and
corresponds to the parameter γi in the theory of Nordblom and ˇZamac
(2012) which have investigated social norm updating within an agent-
based model. In addition, our model contains a local temperature Ti
which measures the susceptibility of agents to external perturbations (ei-
ther influence of neighbors or magnetic field). We then use the heat-bath
algorithm [cf. Krauth (2006)] in order to evaluate statistical averages of
the model. The corresponding program code is written in FORTRAN and
is available upon request. The probability for a spin at lattice site i to take
the values Si =±1 is given by
pi(Si) =
1
1+ exp{−[E(−Si)−E(Si)]/Ti}
(2)
and E(−Si)−E(Si) is the energy change for a spin-flip at site i. Upon
picking a random number 0≤ r ≤ 1 the spin takes the value Si = 1 when
r < pi(Si = 1) and Si =−1 otherwise. One time step then corresponds to
a complete sweep through the lattice.
Following Davis et al. (2003) and Hokamp and Pickhardt (2010) we
consider societies which are composed of the following four types
of agents: (i) selfish a-type agents, which take advantage from non-
compliance (Si = −1) and, thus, are characterized by Bi/Ti < 0 and
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|Bi| > J; (ii) copying b-type agents, which conform to the norm of
their social network and thus copy the behavior with respect to tax eva-
sion from their neighborhood. This can be modeled by Bi << J and
Ji/Ti & 1; (iii) ethical c-type agents, which are practically always com-
pliant (Si = +1) and thus are parametrized by Bi/Ti > 0 and |Bi| > J;
(iv) random d-type agents, which act by chance, within a certain range,
due to some confusion caused by tax law complexity. We implement this
behavior by Bi << J and J/Ti << 1. The parameters distinguishing the
different agent types are taken from Seibold and Pickhardt (2013) and
Pickhardt and Seibold (2014).
In analogy to Zaklan et al. (2008, 2009); Lima (2010) and
Pickhardt and Seibold (2014) we further implement the probability pa
of an audit. If tax evasion is detected the agent is forced to stay compli-
ant over h time steps (penalty period). Such a procedure has also been
implemented in a randomized variant in Lima and Zaklan (2008). We
also note that it is possible to incorporate lapse of time effects, i.e. the
situation where a detected agent is also screened over several years in
the past by the tax authorities (i.e. backaudit). This variant has been
studied within an agent-based econophysics tax compliance model in
Seibold and Pickhardt (2013).
Since in the following we implement the influence of public goods
provision which affects selfish a-types only, it is instructive to consider
the case of a society with all agents being of the same type. The resulting
percentage of tax evasion as a function of time is shown in Fig. 1 for two
penalty periods (h = 5,10).
The first case of endogenous non-compliant selfish agents is shown
in Fig. 1a where at time step zero all agents are set to non-compliance,
i.e. the fraction of non-compliant taxpayers is pnon−cp = 1. Due to the en-
forcement mechanism, pnon−cp is significantly reduced because at each
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Fig. 1. Time evolution of tax evasion corresponding to the fraction of non-compliant taxpayers
pnon−cp. The panels report results for a society consisting of 100% a-type (panel a), 100% b-type
(panel b), 100% c-type (panel c), and 100% d-type (panel d) agents. Solid and black lines display
the tax evasion dynamics for penalty period h = 5 whereas dashed and red lines are for penalty
period h = 10. Audit probability is pa = 10% in each case.
time step a certain percentage of the remaining non-compliant agents are
forced to become compliant. Before reaching a stationary value small
oscillations are observed since after h time steps the first detected agents
can become non-compliant again. Fig. 1b reports the result for copying
b-type agents. As initial condition all agents are set to ’compliant’. Since
b-types tend to copy the behavior of their social network only few of
them change their behavior and the equilibrium value for tax evasion ap-
proaches a rather small value between 4% and 5%. It should be noted that
the equilibrium value is independent of the initial condition. If we would
have set all agents to non-compliant at time step zero, the audits would
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have reduced the percentage of tax evasion to the same equilibrium value
than shown in Fig. 1b.
The time evolution for ethical c-type agents is reported in Fig. 1c.
Here the initial fraction of non-compliant taxpayers is set to pnon−cp = 0
and there is only a very small probability that one of the agents becomes
non-compliant. Since ethical agents avoid tax evasion the results are also
almost independent of the audit probability. Hence, any positive audit
probability would be inefficient in this case.
Finally, Fig. 1d shows the percentage of tax evasion for random d-
type agents. Since these agents act by chance their probability for chang-
ing their behavior from compliant to non-compliant or vice versa would
be of the order of∼ 50% without any audit. The enforcement mechanism
then leads to a further reduction for the equilibrium value of pnon−cp = 0
where larger penalty periods naturally lead to a stronger reduction.
4 The Influence of Public Goods Provision
In our previous considerations the local fields for the ethical (c-
type) and selfish (a-type) agents where initially fixed and indepen-
dent of the time evolution. For ethical agents this means a deep
seated moral attitude inculcated by education, religious convictions [cf.
Heinemann and Schneider (2011)] etc. However, selfish agents are ex-
pected to maximize their personal benefit by deliberating about whether
their profit from public goods is supported, independent or hindered by
the tendency of tax evasion. We therefore set up the following instruc-
tions for selfish a-types:
(a) Compare the provision of public goods between the current and
previous time step. Within our approach this provision is proportional to
the fraction of compliant tax payers pcp (with pcp + pnon−cp = 1) and
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we therefore evaluate ∆ pcp = pcp(tn)− pcp(tn−1). Moreover, only a sub-
stantial improvement or decline |∆ pcp| > ∆ pmin in the provision can be
perceived by an individual, where the threshold of perception ∆ pmin en-
ters as an additional parameter.
(b) Each a-type agent compares its behavior between the current and
previous time step, i.e. ∆Sai = Sai (tn)−Sai (tn−1) where i denotes the lattice
site. The three possible values ∆Sai = −2,0,2 indicate a change from
compliance to non-compliance, no behavioral change and a change from
non-compliance to compliance, respectively.
(c) Change the attitude of a-types towards non-compliance (i.e. the
local field Bi of a-types) by a step ∆B > 0 depending on ∆ pcp and ∆Sai .
Instruction (c) corresponds to the following possibilities which are in
line with the analysis of Falkinger (1995) and summarized in Tab. 1:
Change of Public Goods Provision Change of a-type Behavior Resulting Moral Attitude Change
|∆ pcp|< ∆ pmin ∆Sai =−2,0,2 0
|∆ pcp|> ∆ pmin ∆Sai = 0 0
∆ pcp > ∆ pmin ∆Sai = 2 +∆Bi
∆ pcp <−∆ pmin ∆Sai = 2 −∆Bi
∆ pcp > ∆ pmin ∆Sai =−2 −∆Bi
∆ pcp <−∆ pmin ∆Sai =−2 +∆Bi
Table 1. Summary of how changes in public goods provision and behavioral change of a-types
influence on the (im)moral attitude change of these agents.
|∆ pcp|< ∆ pmin, ∆Sai =−2,0,2: The provision of public goods does not
change significantly, i.e. it is below the threshold of perception ∆ pmin
of selfish agents. The agent therefore keeps its moral attitude and the
field remains unaltered.
|∆ pcp|> ∆ pmin, ∆Sai = 0: The provision of public goods has changed
significantly (i.e. it is above the threshold of perception ∆ pmin of
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selfish agents) while the agent did not change its behavior. It is not
perceivable for the rational agent whether a change of its behavioral
norm would lead to any advantage. Therefore also in this case the
agent tends to keep its moral attitude and the field remains unaltered.
∆ pcp > ∆ pmin, ∆Sai = 2: The agent has changed its behavior from non-
compliant to compliant. Simultaneously the provision of public goods
has significantly increased. The agent therefore recognizes a confir-
mation for its behavioral change and thus becomes less ’unethical’.
This is implemented by a change of its local field Bi → Bi+∆B which
thus becomes less negative.
∆ pcp <−∆ pmin, ∆Sai = 2: The agent has changed its behavior from
non-compliant to compliant but the provision of public goods has
significantly decreased. The agent therefore concludes that its behav-
ioral change is not honored and thus becomes more ’unethical’. The
corresponding change in the local field is Bi → Bi−∆B.
∆ pcp > ∆ pmin, ∆Sai =−2: The agent has changed its behavior from
compliant to non-compliant while the provision of public goods has
significantly increased. The agent is therefore encouraged in its un-
ethical behavior which is implemented by a change in the local field
Bi → Bi−∆B.
∆ pcp <−∆ pmin, ∆Sai =−2: The agent correlates its change from com-
pliant to non-compliant behavior with the decrease of the provision of
public goods suggesting a more ethical behavior. Therefore the local
field changes as Bi → Bi +∆B.
The new parameters entering our approach are thus (i) ∆ pmin (thresh-
old of perception) reflecting the lower bound in the provision of public
goods which can be perceived by an agent, and (ii) the rate of adaption
∆B with which the a-type agent adjusts its behavior to a change in the
provision of public goods. In our simulations we specify ∆ pmin by a cer-
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tain percentage of compliant agents to which it is obviously proportional.
The parameter ∆B is chosen for each a-type agent i as a random number
0 < ∆Bi < ∆Bmax.
Table 2 summarizes the parameters of our model.
Parameter Interpretation Value
Temperature T Susceptibility to External Perturbations T = 5 for a- and c-types.
1 < T < 3 (b-types); 10 < T < 30 (d-types)
Magnetic Field B (Moral) Attitude towards B = 0 (b-, d-types); 10 < B < 20 (c-types)
Tax Evasion B is self-consistently determined for a-types.
Audit Probability pa pa = 0.1
Penalty Period h h = 5,10 time steps
∆Bmax Maximum Rate of Adaption to ∆Bmax = 1 . . .5
Changes in Public Goods Provision
∆ pmin Threshold of Perception for ∆ pmin = 1%, 5%
Changes in Public Goods Provision
Table 2. Compendium of parameters determining the present multi-agent model. Note that tem-
perature and magnetic field are measured in units of the exchange coupling J ≡ 1.
5 Results
In Fig. 2 we investigate the influence of public goods provision on a soci-
ety consisting of 100% selfish a-type agents for various rates of adaption
∆Bmax and two thresholds of perception ∆ pmin = 1% (upper panel) and
∆ pmin = 5% (lower panel). This feedback influences on the local field
distribution P(Bi) which is now determined self-consistently as described
above. At time step tn = 0 selfish a-types are given a flat distribution of
local fields confined to the range−10 < Bi <−20 and which is shown by
the black curve in the main panels of Fig. 2. Note that this is a general-
ization of Lima and Zaklan (2008) which have used a single field value.
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However, the feedback of public goods leads to a redistribution of P(Bi)
which for large times becomes stationary and for different ∆Bmax and
∆ pmin is shown in the main panel of Fig. 2.
Interestingly one observes two regimes in the distribution of local
fields. For small ∆Bmax the distribution transforms into a Gaussian and
shifts to larger mean values Bmean which are still in the range Bmean < 0,
i.e. the majority of agents is still characterized as non-compliant taxpay-
ers. From the insets to Fig. 2 we observe that the dynamics in this case is
similar to the one without feedback of public goods. Due to the shift of
P(B) to larger mean values a slight reduction in the stationary value of tax
evasion becomes visible, especially for larger thresholds of perception.
Above a critical value of the adaption rate (∆Bcritmax ≈ 2.5 for ∆ pmin =
1 and ∆Bcritmax ≈ 4.5 for ∆ pmin = 5) one observes a broad distribution
with a mean value which is now deep in the positive B-regime, i.e. most
of the selfish a-type agents show a dominant compliant behavior. As a
consequence the stationary value of tax evasion (insets to Fig. 2) is now
strongly reduced and the remaining tax evaders are solely due to the ’neg-
ative B’ agents in the tail of P(B).
We emphasize that the distributions shown in the main panels of Fig.
2 are stationary distributions, i.e. obtained after t = 200 time steps. We
have checked that the same distributions are obtained after t = 5,000 time
steps in both regimes. Clearly, the crossover between the two regimes is
due to a self-sustaining effect when the agents start to become compliant
and thus enhance the provision of public goods, combined with the audit
which enforces the detected agent to change its behavior from Si = −1
to Si = +1 over the following h periods. According to the mechanism
summarized in the third line of Tab. 1 a regime where the provision of
public goods has significantly increased, induces a behavioral change of
non-compliant agents upon auditing. This in turn enhances the provision
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of public goods and is responsible for the self-sustaining effect leading
to the crossover between the two regimes.
An interesting (but also pathological) situation may arise when the
distribution of local fields is centered around B = 0. In this case there
may appear long term oscillations between both regimes, i.e. between
substantial and small fractions of tax evaders. For the present parameters
such situation occurs for threshold value ∆ pmin = 0 and a critical adap-
tion rate of ∆Bmax = 1. For values ∆Bmax > 1 the resulting distributions
are similar to the case ∆ pmin = 1% but shifted to larger (positive) mean
values.
How are the above results generalized within a multi-agent model?
To answer this question we calculate the fraction of tax evasion for
a society consisting of 35% b-types, 15% d-types and the residual
share of a- and c-types is varied. Note that the percentage of 15% d-
types can be motivated from estimates for U.S. households taken from
Andreoni et al. (1998). Similar agent shares have also been investigated
by Hokamp and Pickhardt (2010) and Pickhardt and Seibold (2014). We
choose an adaption rate of ∆Bmax = 4 so that for small threshold of per-
ception pmin = 1% (panel a) the majority of a-type agents undergoes a
transition towards compliant behavior (cf. Fig. 2). As a consequence the
fraction of evaders for societies consisting of 50%, 40%, and 30% a-
types is drastically reduced as is apparent from Fig. 3a. This reduction
becomes less pronounced for smaller a-type shares (e.g. 20% a-types).
In fact, the transition of a-types from non-compliance to compliance ob-
served in Fig. 2 is driven by a significant change (enhancement) in the
public goods provision. Now a large share of c-types obviously consti-
tutes the fraction of compliant agents and therefore to the public goods
provision but this contribution is constant over time. On the other hand,
the behavioral change of a-types is induced by a concomitant change in
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the public goods provision and this change is naturally reduced when the
fraction of c-types becomes to large. Therefore we observe only moder-
ate to small reduction in tax evasion for a-type shares of 20%, 10%, and
0%.
Fig. 3b reports analogous results for a larger threshold of perception
pmin = 5%. From the previous results shown in Fig. 2 we know that for
this parameter the mean value of the field distribution for a-types is still
in the negative range so that non-compliance is predominant. As a conse-
quence also the effective share of non-compliant agents for the composed
society is only moderately reduced upon allowing for the feedback from
public goods provision.
6 Discussion and Outlook
We have investigated the influence of public goods provision on tax eva-
sion within an econophysics model which describes the interaction of
various behavioral types of agents. Within our framework only selfish (a-
types) agents are susceptible to the provision of public goods and we have
shown that their behavioral attitude towards tax evasion is determined by
a dynamic local ’field-parameter’ Bi. As a result we find that an initially
flat distribution P(Bi) is altered self-consistently due to the feedback of
public goods provision leading to a generic shift towards larger field
value (increased ’morality’ of agents). This in turn can reduce tax evasion
in agreement with previous investigations within the economics domain
Szabo´ et al. (2010). Also experimental data in the context of tax evasion
Alm et al. (1992a,b) support the finding that compliance increases when
taxpayers receive a public good in return for their payment. On the other
hand Hokamp (2014) implements public goods provision via an utility
function which is the crucial factor for the counterintuitive result that in-
come tax evasion may increase providing a higher level of public goods.
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With regard to our present approach the different result can be traced
back to a different behavior upon the increase of public goods provision
(cf. third line of Tab. 1) where the selfish agent in Hokamp (2014) does
not increase its moral attitude.
Two parameters govern the feedback of public goods provision to the
behavioral change of selfish agents: (i) the rate of adaption ∆Bmax and
(ii) the threshold of perception ∆ pmin towards changes in public goods
provision. ∆Bmax is an endogenous parameter of the agents which may
depend on age but otherwise is not susceptible to external influence. On
the other hand, policymakers can to a certain extend influence on the
threshold of perception ∆ pmin by means of targeted public relations. In
practice this may be achieved by announcements via public media also
about minor state projects.
Since often public goods provision is more important for the el-
der generation (as e.g. in case of health care) it may also partially ac-
count for their stronger tax morale as found by Nordblom and ˇZamac
(2012). However, in our econophysics model we have assumed a
constant (over time) distribution of agent types. On the other hand,
Nordblom and ˇZamac (2012) have set up an economic model which de-
scribes how social beings update their personal norms. Implementing
these mechanisms in our model would allow for the transformation be-
tween different agent types and is an interesting perspective for future
research.
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Fig. 2. Main panel: The distribution of local fields for various rates of adaption ∆Bmax. The case
∆Bmax = 0 corresponds to the case with no feedback of public goods which is identical to the dis-
tribution used in Fig. 1a. Results are reported for a societcy consisting of 100% a-types, enforce-
ment with fixed compliance period h = 5 and audit probability pa = 10%. The initial distribution
of local fields is confined to the range −20 < Bi < −10. Inset: Time evolution of tax evasion
(fraction of non-compliant agents pnon−cp). Top panel: Threshold of perception ∆ pmin = 1%,
Lower panel: Threshold of perception ∆ pmin = 5%.
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Fig. 3. Time evolution of tax evasion (fraction of non-compliant agents pnon−cp) for a society
consisting of 35% b-types and 15% d-types. The fraction of a- and c-types is indicated in the
panels. Solid lines report the result without and dashed lines the result including the feedback
of public goods provision. Results are obtained for enforcement with fixed compliance period
h = 5 and audit probability pa = 10%. The initial distribution of local fields is confined to the
range −20 < Bi <−10 and the rate of adaption is ∆Bmax = 4. Panel (a): Threshold of perception
∆ pmin = 1%, Panel (b): Threshold of perception ∆ pmin = 5%.
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